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Abstract
We investigate the conflict between the ex ante and ex post criteria of social
welfare in a new framework of individual and social decisions, which distinguishes
between two sources of uncertainty, here interpreted as being objective and subjective
respectively. This framework makes it possible to endow the individuals and society
not only with ex ante and ex post preferences, as is usually done, but also with
interim preferences of two kinds, and correspondingly, to introduce interim forms of
the Pareto principle. After characterizing the two social welfare criteria, we present
two compromises between them, one based on the ex ante criterion and absorbing
as much as possible of the ex post criterion (Theorem 1), the other based on the ex
post criterion and absorbing as much as possible of the ex ante criterion (Theorem
2). Both solutions translate the assumed Pareto conditions into weighted additive
utility representations, as in Harsanyi’s Aggregation Theorem, and both attribute to
the individuals common probability values on the objective source of uncertainty, and
different probability values on the subjective source. We discuss these solutions in
terms of the by now classic spurious unanimity argument and a novel informational
argument labelled complementary ignorance. The paper complies with the standard
economic methodology of basing probability and utility representations on preference
axioms.
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1 Introduction
Any normative analysis of collective decisions under uncertainty must confront an old and
unresolved problem: the conflict between the ex ante and ex post criteria of social wel-
fare. This paper proposes new solutions to this problem, which are based on a distinction
between two sources of uncertainty. In our framework, agents may hold different beliefs
about one source while holding the same beliefs about the other. Before explaining what
difference this twofold uncertainty makes, we restate the conflict in its classical form.
The ex ante social welfare criterion assumes that the individuals form preferences over
social uncertain prospects according to some decision theory – typically that of subjective
expected utility (SEU) – and it applies the Pareto principle to these ex ante individual
preferences, thus following an ex ante version of the principle. In contrast, the ex post
social welfare criterion assumes that society itself forms preferences over social prospects
according to the normative decision theory under consideration, while it endows the indi-
viduals only with state-by-state preferences. It then applies the Pareto principle statewise
to these ex post individual preferences, thus following an ex post version of the principle.1
If all agents satisfy the axioms of subjective expected utility, or even weaker axioms, then
the ex ante and ex post criteria are generally incompatible.
This conflict has long been recognized, although the problem has been formulated in
several different ways. The early statements by Starr (1973) and Hammond (1981, 1983)
belonged to traditional welfare economics, and envisaged only two extreme solutions, i.e.,
endorsing one of the two criteria and rejecting the other. Mongin’s (1995) abstract formula-
tion in terms of Savage’s (1972) SEU postulates avoided the domain-specific assumptions
made by the welfare economists, thus sharpening the conflict, while also showing that
probability or utility dependencies between the individuals could alleviate it. This ax-
iomatic approach also facilitated comparison with Harsanyi’s (1955) Social Aggregation
Theorem, which famously says that, if both individuals and society form their preferences
over social lotteries according to von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) theory, and the social
preferences satisfy the Pareto principle, then society’s preferences can be represented by a
weighted (“utilitarian”) sum of individual utility representations.2 As the Pareto principle
applies here both ex ante (to lotteries) and ex post (to final outcomes as a degenerate
case of lotteries), Harsanyi’s assumptions contain all the ingredients of the two welfare
criteria, and his weighted sum formula seems to contradict the claim that the two criteria
are incompatible. However, the assumption of a common lottery set amounts to imposing
identical probabilities on the individuals and society, an extreme case of those probabilistic
dependencies which make the criteria compatible.
This paper will also exploit the fact that the conflict between them vanishes when prob-
abilities are identical, but in a much more general fashion than Harsanyi. We also derive
weighted sum representations of social utility, but depart from his simplifying probabilistic
1Note the difference between a social welfare criterion and the corresponding Pareto principle. There
is more to the the ex ante (ex post) social welfare criterion than just the ex ante (ex post) Pareto principle,
because a criterion also decides where rationality assumptions apply (to the individuals or society).
2The utilitarian interpretation of Harsanyi remains controversial; see Sen’s (1986) objections and the
discussion in Weymark (1991). Fleurbaey and Mongin (2016) propose a new defense of Harsanyi’s position.
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treatment. Our individuals have probabilistic beliefs that differ on one source of uncer-
tainty and are identical on the other, while society, if it entertains probabilistic beliefs at
all, adopts those of the individuals when they are identical. This contrast emerges only at
the level of representation theorems, because the paper follows the standard methodology
of taking preferences to be the only axiomatic primitives. Thus, our treatment general-
izes Harsanyi’s in two ways, i.e., both by reducing the scope of his common probability
assumption and by endogenizing it.
Semantically, we distinguish the two sources of uncertainty as being objective and sub-
jective according to whether the endogenous probabilities are identical or not - hence the
labels O and S we later use for their respective state spaces. This is but one interpretation
of the results, but we can defend it as follows. If preferences are the only primitives, it is
impossible to differentiate between the forms of uncertainty in terms of exogeneous prob-
abilitic information, and what the endogeneous probabilistic information reveals is only
whether probabilities are identical or not. Then, either one should drop the distinction
between objective and subjective uncertainty, or one should base it on what is available.
Since the distinction seems well established in the ordinary language of economics, we opt
for the former solution and thus say that uncertainty is objective when both the individ-
uals and society assign identical probabilities, and subjective when the individuals assign
different probabilities and society leaves this diversity unregulated.
This endogenous distinction is actually foreshadowed at the level of preference axioms.
A key step is the introduction of conditional preferences : for both society and the in-
dividuals, we posit preferences conditional on O and preferences conditional on S, each
obeying distinctive properties. These properties will eventually determine whether or not
probabilistic beliefs exist for society, the individuals or both, and whether or not such prob-
abilistic beliefs are shared between those who entertain them. By introducing conditional
preferences, we are also able to consider new, interim forms of the Pareto principle, in
addition to the classic ex ante and ex post forms. By simultaneously varying the forms of
the Pareto principle and the properties of conditionals, we obtain a rich set of possibilities.
The paper explores these possibilities to discover new compromises between the ex ante
and the ex post social welfare criteria. The most interesting ones are those which capitalize
on one of the two criteria and absorb as much of the contents of the other criterion as is
possible without returning the classic conflict between them. There are two such optimal
compromises in the paper, which are characterized in our two main results.
Theorem 1 combines the ex ante criterion in full with a partial version of the ex post
criterion, which is limited to the objective source of uncertainty. At the level of repre-
sentations, all individuals and society assign identical probabilities to O, but regarding S,
individuals can assign different probabilities, while society contents itself with recording
preferences without forming probabilities of its own. This solution makes society’s ex post
preferences state-dependent – i.e., the ex post social solution varies according to which
state is realized – a flexibility that several writers have already judged attractive in the
standard framework of a single source of uncertainty. By contrast, Theorem 2 encapsulates
the ex post criterion in full and a partial version of the ex ante criterion, which replaces
the ex ante Pareto principle by the interim form relative to the objective source of uncer-
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tainty. At the level of representations, it is still the case that all individuals and society
assign identical probabilities on O, while individuals can assign different probabilities to
S. However, this time, society forms probabilities on S; importantly, these are unrelated
to those of the individuals. This solution calls for a comparison with the influential one
defined by Gilboa et al. (2004) for the standard framework of uncertainty.
Besides axiomatizing these two compromises, the paper attempts to assess them con-
ceptually. Two main critical arguments are involved, i.e., the spurious unanimity objection,
which was first developed by Mongin (1997) and has become fairly well accepted today,
and the complementary ignorance objection, which we introduce in this paper. Our ex
ante-based compromise (Theorem 1) avoids the complementary ignorance objection, while
falling prey to the spurious unanimity objection, as does any solution that retains the ex
ante Pareto principle; however, this defect can be traded off against the advantage of hav-
ing a state-dependent ex post social welfare function at one’s disposal. The compromise of
Gilboa et al. (2004) was devised to eschew the spurious unanimity objection, but turns out
to be open to the complementary ignorance objection, and this also holds of various recent
proposals. By contrast, our ex post-based compromise (Theorem 2) avoids both objections
at the same time, which is a reason for preferring it to its predecessors. More specifically,
Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler’s representation theorem turns society’s probabilities into
a weighted sum of the individual probabilities, whereas, in ours, the two kinds of proba-
bilities remain unconnected. The “linear pooling rule”, as it is called in the statistics and
management literatures, is the implicit target of our complementary ignorance objection.3
The paper is divided as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework, and the various
decision-theoretic and Pareto conditions. As a preliminary for our more original results,
Section 3 axiomatizes the ex ante social welfare criterion (Proposition 1), the ex post so-
cial welfare criterion (Proposition 2), and illustrates their conflict (Proposition 3). Section
4 proposes our first optimal compromise (Theorem 1), based on the ex ante criterion,
and Section 5 our second optimal compromise (Theorem 2), based on the ex post crite-
rion. Corollaries 1 and 2 show that reinforcing the assumptions of either theorem would
reproduce the conflict of Proposition 3. Section 6 describes the spurious unanimity and
complementary ignorance problems, and discusses our solutions as well as that of Gilboa
et al. (2004) in this light. Section 7 reviews recent literature also in this light. The more
technical material, including the proofs of the results, appear in two appendices. The
results of this paper primarily depend on the mathematics of separable preference orders.
Appendix A restates the concepts and general theorems from this theory (some well-known,
others our own work); Appendix B uses these tools to prove our results.
2 The framework
Uncertain prospects. We assume that states of the world are pairs (s, o), where s ∈ S
and o ∈ O represent two distinctive sources of uncertainty. We often refer to them as the
3The earlier literature on the linear pooling rule is vast; see among others Genest and Zidek (1986) and
Clemen and Winkler (2007).
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subjective and objective source —but this is merely a terminological convention until we
reach our main results (Theorems 1 and 2). We often identify the events {s} × O and
S×{o} with the states s and o; similar routine identifications will occur later in the paper.
We assume that S and O are finite with |S| , |O| ≥ 2. Let ∆S and ∆O be the sets of
probability vectors on S and O, respectively. We assume that the individuals i belong to
a finite set I with |I| ≥ 2, and that each individual i and society face uncertain prospects.
These can be completely uncertain (when both s and o are unknown), subjectively uncertain
(o is fixed and s is unknown), or objectively uncertain (s is fixed and o is unknown). We refer
to prospects in the last two classes as interim prospects. “Learning s” means observing
the event {s} × O. Likewise, “learning o” means observing the event S × {o}.
We think of prospects as mappings from states of the world to consequences, and
express consequences directly in terms of payoff numbers xiso for the individuals. For all
i ∈ I, s ∈ S, o ∈ O, we assume that xiso varies across R; these domain assumptions are
discussed at the end of the section. We leave it for the interpretation to decide whether
the xiso numbers represent physical payoffs (levels of consumption in a good) or subjective
payoffs (utility values in some metric). We define a completely uncertain prospect:
• in the case of an individual i ∈ I, as a matrix Xi = (xiso)s∈S,o∈O ∈ RS×O,
• in the case of society, as a three-dimensional array, X = (xiso)i∈Is∈S,o∈O ∈ RI×S×O.
We define an objectively uncertain (respectively, subjectively uncertain) prospect:
• in the case of an individual i ∈ I, as any vector xis = (xiso)o∈O ∈ RO for some fixed
s ∈ S (respectively, xio = (xiso)s∈S ∈ RS for some fixed o ∈ O),
• in the case of society, as any matrix Xs = (xiso)i∈Io∈O ∈ RI×O for some fixed s ∈ S
(respectively, Xo = (x
i
so)
i∈I
s∈S ∈ RI×S for some fixed o ∈ O).
When uncertainty is completely resolved, an individual i faces a scalar xiso, while society
faces a vector xso = (x
i
so)
i∈I ∈ RI .
Preferences. We assume that the individuals and society assess completely uncertain
prospects in terms of ex ante preference relations, denoted by %i for i ∈ I and % for society;
these are our only preference primitives. Throughout the paper, we take %i and % to be
continuous weak orders, thus representable by continuous real-valued utility functions.
The other preference relations of this paper are conditional relations induced by either
the %i or %. There are six of them to consider: %is, %io and %iso for individual i, and
%s, %o and %so for society. While %iso and %so make ex post comparisons, %is, %s, %io
and %o make interim comparisons, which are specific to the present framework. As usual,
conditional preferences are defined by restricting unconditional preferences to prospects
that vary only along the component of interest. It suffices to illustrate this definition by
two cases (see Appendix A for more formalism). For all xis,y
i
s ∈ RO, the conditional %is is
defined by:
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xis %is yis iff Xi %i Yi for some Xi,Yi ∈ RS×O such that xis and yis are the
(vector-valued) s-components of Xi and Yi, while Xi and Yi coincide on all
other components.
(Definitions for %io , %o and %s follow mutatis mutandis.) For all xso,yso ∈ RI , the
conditional %so is defined by:
xso %so yso iff X % Y for some X,Y ∈ RI×S×O such that xso and yso are the
(vector-valued) (s, o)-components of X and Y, while X and Y coincide on all
other components.
Properties of conditionals. The conditional relations defined above are complete, but
not necessarily transitive. To make them so, a separability condition must be added. This
says in effect that the postulated comparisons between the conditional and the source rela-
tion do not depend on which alternatives are chosen, provided these alternatives coincide
outside the components of the conditional. To illustrate with the first example, %i is said
to be separable in s if, for all X,Y, X˜, Y˜ ∈ RS×O,
if xs = x˜s and ys = y˜s, while X coincides with Y, and X˜ with Y˜, on the components
other than s, then the following holds:
X %i Y iff X˜ %i Y˜.
If %i is separable in s, then %is is transitive, hence a bona fide ordering. The converse also
holds. Appendix A restates this basic fact in general form.
The conditional relations %iso compare real numbers, and we will assume that they
agree with the natural ordering of these numbers. That is, for all (s, o) ∈ S ×O, all i ∈ I
and all xiso, y
i
so ∈ R,
xiso %iso yiso if and only if xiso ≥ yiso. (1)
This is consistent with the payoff interpretation of these numbers, and it automatically
makes the %iso transitive.
For all other conditional relations, we do not generally assume transitivity (or the equiv-
alent property of separability). Our results crucially depend on selecting which conditionals
are transitive. For ease of expression, when a conditional has this property, whether by
way of assumption or by way of conclusion, we say that its source relation induces a pref-
erence ordering. Thus, “%i induces an interim preference ordering %is” means that %is is
transitive, or equivalently, that %i is separable in s; and similarly with the other cases. We
always make such transitivity assumptions uniformly across the uncertainty type. That
is, we take the ordering property of conditionals to hold either either for all s or for none,
either for all o or for none, either for all (s, o) or for none. For example, we will simply say,
“%i induces interim preference orderings %is” without adding the implied “for all s in S”.4
When %i or % induces conditional preference orderings of some uncertainty type, we
may, by a separate decision, require that these preferences be identical across the given
4 The requirement that separability conditions hold across the uncertainty type means that they are
equivalent to dominance conditions for the given type.
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type, in which case we say that they are invariant. That is, we may assume not only that
%i induces interim preference orderings %is, but also that %is= %is′ for all s, s′ ∈ S; not only
that % induces ex post preference orderings %so, but also that %so = %s′o′ for all s, s′ ∈ S,
and all o, o′ ∈ O, etc. For any i in I, {%iso}(s,o)∈S×O are invariant, by statement (1).
The meaning of these invariance assumptions should be clear. For instance, if%i induces
invariant interim %is preferences, then the resolution of uncertainty about s has no influence
on i’s preferences over interim prospects that depend on o, hence for all decision purposes,
i regards s as being uninformative about o. If % induces invariant ex post preferences %so,
then society has state-independent ex post preferences.
For suitable ordering and invariance assumptions put on the conditionals, our frame-
work give rise to SEU representations of individual preferences, social preferences, or both
of them. The theorems and propositions below make the existence and uniqueness proper-
ties of these representations part of a wider set of conclusions, but we have extracted the
underlying representation theorem as Proposition A2 in Appendix A. It could be compared
with the founding results of Savage (1972) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963), but we do
not pursue this comparison here; see Mongin and Pivato (2015) and Mongin (2017).5
As some assumptions relative to these conditionals recur in the formal statements below,
it will be convenient to have labels for them.
• Assumption (A1) (resp. (B1)) says that for each individual i (resp. for society), the
preference ordering i (resp. ) induces interim preference orderings is (resp. s)
for all s ∈ S, and also interim preference orderings io (resp. o) for all o ∈ O.
• When (A1) (resp. (B1)) holds, Assumption (A2) (resp. B2)) says that these interim
preferences are moreover invariant —i.e. independent of the s and o indices.
Pareto conditions. In the standard framework, social preference under uncertainty is
subjected to Pareto conditions defined either ex ante or ex post. But our framework yields
more options. Here, the ex ante condition applies to completely uncertain prospects, the ex
post condition applies to fully resolved prospects, and two newly defined interim conditions
apply to objectively uncertain prospects and subjectively uncertain prospects. These are
formally defined as follows.
• Ex ante Pareto principle: for all X,Y ∈ RI×S×O: if Xi  i Yi for all i ∈ I, then
X  Y; if, in addition, Xi i Yi for some i ∈ I, then X  Y.
• Ex post Pareto principle: for all (s, o) ∈ S × O, and all x, y ∈ RI : if xi ≥ yi for all
i ∈ I, then x  so y; if, in addition, xi > yi for some i ∈ I, then x so y;
• Objective interim Pareto principle: for all s ∈ S, and all X,Y ∈ RI×O: if xi  is yi
for all i ∈ I, then X s Y; if, in addition, xi is yi for some i ∈ I, then X s Y;
5Briefly: despite finiteness assumptions that resemble Anscombe and Aumann’s, our theorems follow
Savage by relying on a pure uncertainty framework, and eschewing any probabilistic primitives.
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• Subjective interim Pareto principle: for all o ∈ O, and all X,Y ∈ RI×S : if xi  io yi
for all i ∈ I, then X o Y; if, in addition, xi io yi for some i ∈ I, then X o Y.
The interim Pareto principles are called objective or subjective, depending on which un-
certainty remains to be resolved (they draw their denomination from the the prospects
they handle, not the conditioning variable).6 Since these are recurring assumptions, we
will label the ex ante Pareto and ex post Pareto principles by (A3) and (B3), respectively.
Domain assumptions. In this paper, we assume maximal domains of objects; all are
indeed of the form RL for some L. This neglects feasibility considerations. It may well
be that not every array, matrix or vector of payoff values can be obtained by a prospect
that is feasible for the individuals or society. But our domain assumptions are just for
mathematical simplicity, and it would be possible to replace them by more realistic ones.
The proofs of this paper use a mathematical theory of separability, developed in Mongin
and Pivato (2015), which allows for domains that are not Cartesian products, but only
satisfy certain connectedness properties (convex sets being a particular case). We refrained
from applying this theory in full generality in order not to add further complexity.
3 The ex ante and ex post criteria of social welfare
The first result of this section axiomatically characterizes the ex ante social welfare crite-
rion in the twofold uncertainty framework. Assumptions (A1) and (A2) indirectly endow
individual preferences with SEU representations. In other words, to obtain such a repre-
sentation, it suffices that individuals have well-defined interim preferences for both types
of uncertainty, and that these preferences be invariant. This is the SEU representation
theorem mentioned in Section 2; it will recur in Proposition 2 as well as Theorems 1 and
2 below. Assumption (A3) (the ex ante Pareto principle) then allows the ex ante social
preference to be represented by a function that is increasing with the individual SEU
representations.
Proposition 1 Suppose that (A1) for all i ∈ I, the individual preferences i induce
interim preference orderings is and io, and (A2) both families of orderings are invariant.
Suppose also that (A3)  satisfies the ex ante Pareto principle.
Then, for all i ∈ I, there are strictly positive probability vectors pi ∈ ∆S and qi ∈ ∆O,
and an increasing continuous utility function ui on R, such that the preference i admits
the following SEU representation:
U i(X) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
qiop
i
su
i(xso), for all X ∈ RS×O. (2)
6Implicitly, we define all forms of the Pareto principle except for the ex ante one in terms of binary rela-
tions rather than bona fide preference orderings. This makes these Pareto conditions logically independent
of the decision-theoretic conditions discussed above.
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Moreover, there is a continuous increasing function F on the range of the vector-valued
function (U i)i∈I such that  is represented by the ex ante social welfare function
Wxa(X) := F (
[
U i(Xi)
]
i∈I), for all X ∈ RI×S×O. (3)
In these representations, for all i ∈ I, the probability vectors pi and qi are unique, and
ui is unique up to positive affine transformations, while F is unique up to continuous
increasing transformations.
Each SEU representation U i builds upon two probability functions pi and qi, which
represent i’s beliefs about S and O, respectively. Given the multiplicative form qio pis, the
events in S × O associated with s values and those associated with o values are stochas-
tically independent according to i. Accordingly, i would not revise the probability values
for one class of events upon learning which event of the other class of events occurs. Fore-
shadowing this informational property, the conditional preferences is and io have SEU
representations independent of s and o, respectively. What is missing is a semantic dis-
tinction between the two sources of uncertainty, as their symmetric treatment does not yet
permit interpreting one as being objective and the other as being subjective.
Paralleling Proposition 1, the second result of this section axiomatically characterizes
the ex post social welfare criterion in the twofold uncertainty framework. We apply to
society the same decision-theoretic constraints as we earlier put on the individuals: as-
sumptions (B1) and (B2) require that society have well-defined interim preferences for
both types of uncertainty, and that these preferences be invariant. This endows society
with an SEU representation. Assumption (B3) (the ex post Pareto principle) ensures that
the utility function in this representation (the ex post social welfare function) is increasing
in the individuals’ utility functions.
Proposition 2 Suppose that (B1) the social preference  induces interim preference or-
derings s and o, and (B2) both families of orderings are invariant. Suppose also that
(B3)  satisfies the ex post Pareto principle.
Then, the ex post social preference relations so are orderings and they are invariant,
and there is a continuous and increasing representation Wxp for them. There also exist
strictly positive probability vectors p ∈ ∆S and q ∈ ∆O such that  has the following SEU
representation:
Wxa(X) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
psqoWxp(xso), for all X ∈ RI×S×O. (4)
In this representation, p and q are unique, and the ex post social welfare function Wxp is
unique up to positive affine transformations.
The probabilities p and q that appear here, again in multiplicative form, belong to
society exclusively. Like the individuals in Proposition 1, society regards the two sources
of uncertainty as being informationally unrelated, and as in this proposition, it is not yet
possible to distinguish between objective and subjective uncertainty.
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We close this section by restating in the twofold uncertainty framework a theorem from
Mongin and Pivato (2015) that formalizes the conflict between the ex ante and ex post
welfare criteria. This result improves on the classic ones by deriving the same undesirable
conclusion — that the individuals’ and society’s probabilities are all identical — under
weaker axiomatic conditions. These consist solely of the ex ante Pareto principle, which is
just one part of the ex ante criterion, and the decision-theoretic requirement that society
have state-independent ex post social preferences, which is only one logical implication of
the ex post criterion. In the present framework, the undesirable conclusion says that all
individuals and society have the same beliefs on the whole state space S ×O.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the social preference  induces invariant ex post preference
orderings so and the ex ante Pareto principle holds.
Then, there are a strictly positive probability vector pi ∈ ∆S×O, and for all i ∈ I,
continuous and increasing utility functions ui on R such that the ex ante social preference
 admits the following expected utility representation:
Wxa(X) =
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
pisoWxp(xso), for all X ∈ RI×S×O,
with
Wxp(xso) =
∑
i∈I
ui(xiso), for all xso ∈ RI .
As a result, the ex post Pareto principle holds, and for all i ∈ I, i admits a SEU repre-
sentation:
U i(X) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
piso u
i(xso), for all X ∈ RS×O.
In these representations, pi is unique, and the ui are unique up to a positive affine trans-
formation with a common multiplier.
Our strategy will now consist in enriching each social welfare criterion with as much as
possible of the other that can be added without triggering a conclusion similar to that of
3. Section 4 proceeds from the ex ante criterion, and Section 5 from the ex post criterion.
4 An ex ante-oriented reconciliation
Our first main result, Theorem 1, enriches the ex ante social welfare criterion —or
equivalently assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3) of Proposition 1 —with part of the decision-
theoretic content of the ex post social welfare criterion. Regarding the social interim pref-
erences on o, we require that they be both well-defined and invariant, but regarding the
social interim preferences on s, we only require that they be well-defined. In terms of
Proposition 2, this amounts to postulating the full force of (B1) while weakening (B2). We
also want (B3) (the ex post Pareto principle) to hold, but this turns out to be implied by
the aforementioned assumptions. Indeed, besides delivering a full ex ante representation
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for society, Theorem 1 endows it with a state-dependent ex post representation satisfying
the ex post Pareto principle. More comments follow the formal statement, regarding the
status of the probabilities and the additive form of the representations. The ensuing Corol-
lary 1 shows the compromise of Theorem 1 to be optimal: adding any more of the ex post
criterion yields an undesirable conclusion.
Theorem 1 Take the full set of assumptions for the ex ante criterion in Proposition 1),
i.e., (A1), (A2) and (A3). Among the assumptions for the ex post criterion in Proposition
2, take (B1), i.e., that  induces interim social preference orderings s and o, but suppose
only that the interim preferences o are invariant, a weakening of (B2).
Then, for all i ∈ I, the SEU representations of Proposition 1 for ex ante individual
preferences hold with q1 = ... = qn = q, i.e., for all i ∈ I,
U i(X) =
∑
o∈O
∑
s∈S
qo p
i
s u
i(xso), for all X ∈ RS×O.
Furthermore, the ex ante social preference  is now represented by the additive ex ante
social welfare function
Wxa(X) :=
∑
i∈I
Ui =
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
qo p
i
s u
i(xiso), for all X ∈RI×S×O, (5)
and for all states (s, o) ∈ S × O,  induces a state-dependent ex post social preference
ordering so represented by
Wxp,s(x) :=
∑
i∈I
pis u
i(xiso), for all x ∈ RI . (6)
The interim social preferences s and o are represented by the relevant sums in the
formula for Wxa. As a consequence, (B3) holds, i.e., the ex post Pareto principle holds,
and the objective interim Pareto principle also holds.
In these representations, q and each pi are unique, while the utility functions ui are
unique up to a positive affine transformation with a common multiplier.
The conclusions of Theorem 1 strengthens those of the baseline Proposition 1 in several
ways. First of all, the individuals can entertain idiosyncratic probabilistic beliefs pi on
S, but must adopt common probabilistic beliefs q on O; on its part, society entertains
probabilistic beliefs on O, which are also given by q, but no such beliefs about S. The
asymmetric treatment now justifies our interpretation of S as a subjective and O as an
objective source of uncertainty.
Second, Theorem 1 turns the unspecified social welfare function Wxa of Proposition 1
into a weighted sum of individual expected utilities, as in Harsanyi’s (1955) Social Aggre-
gation Theorem. However, the identity of probabilistic beliefs is here derived, not merely
assumed, and moreover restricted to the objective part of the uncertainty. From the Wxa
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function, weighted sum representations follow for conditional social preferences. We now
comment on these representations. The representation of the %o conditionals:∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
pisu
i(xiso)
is independent of o, but the representation of the s conditionals:∑
i∈I
∑
o∈O
qop
i
su
i(xiso)
depends on s, as does the representation (6) of the state-dependent ex post social preference
relation. so. State-dependence of social preferences is one way to reconcile the ex ante
and ex post criteria of social welfare.7 An important feature of the last two utility sums
is that state-dependence occurs through the factors pis. This means that the individuals
who assigned s the highest probability are those who are most favoured by the ex post
social welfare function if s realizes. Although this is an uncommon arrangement, it can
be defended on the ground that these individuals were better predictors than the others,
and presumably made more suitable provisions, which somehow deserves rewarding. Also,
perhaps the individuals themselves would endorse these weights, since their subjective
likelihood assessments express the subjective importance they put on each state. (We
thank a referee for this suggestion.) However, these normative intuitions must be balanced
against another, which is that poor predictors presumably made less adequate provisions,
which may call for compensation. Both intuitions clash with a third: that questions of
social ethics should not be decided by comparing the correctness (or luck) of the individuals’
beliefs. We must leave the interpretational debate at this stage.
Theorem 1 adds as much as possible of the ex post criterion to the ex ante criterion.
By assuming the full force of (B2) —i.e., making the social interim preferences on s not
only well-defined, but also also invariant —one derives a social probability p also on the
subjective source, and this forces the individuals to align their probabilities pi with this p.
Corollary 1 The assumptions are those of Theorem 1 except that (B2) now holds in full,
i.e., both the %o and the %s are invariant. Then, the representations of Theorem 1 hold
with a common probability vector p ∈ ∆S such that p1 = ... = pn= p.
All in all, Theorem 1 appears to be a welcome improvement on the position of those
writers, in the early welfare economics controversy, who bluntly adopted the ex ante social
welfare criterion and rejected the ex post one. Among the more recent participants, Hild
et al. (2003) and Risse (2003) have made a sophisticated case for the former against the
7In the standard framework, with a single source of uncertainty, Mongin (1998), Chambers and Hayashi
(2006) and Keeney and Nau (2011) have explored this solution. It is not merely formal, but normatively
defensible, as it seems desirable that society could change the individuals’ weights in the utility sum
according to which state of the world is realized. In the standard framework, this solution might leave
society without any probabilistic beliefs at all. But Theorem 1 does away with social probability only for
the subjective part of uncertainty.
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latter. In effect, they argue that social and individual preferences are always ex ante. For
them, the distinction between final consequences and uncertain prospects is a matter of
convention; a more refined analysis of these consequences would reveal that they define
yet another class of uncertain prospects. By focusing on this particular class, the ex post
Pareto principle makes an arbitrary restriction to the ex ante principle, while being open
to the same difficulties; hence it should be avoided, and so should the ex post social welfare
criterion, which includes it.8 However, this argument does not have the same implications
here as in a framework with a single source of uncertainty. While it encourages the adoption
of the ex ante criterion when the only other choice is the ex post criterion, it may push in
favour of compromise solutions when these become available, as is the case here.
5 An ex post-oriented reconciliation
Our second main result, Theorem 2, enriches the ex post social welfare criterion —or equiv-
alently assumptions (B1), (B2) and (B3) of Proposition 2 —with the decision-theoretic part
of the ex ante social welfare criterion, but only some of its Paretian content. Specifically,
we require the objective interim Pareto principle to hold instead of the full ex ante prin-
ciple. In terms of Proposition 1, this amounts to invoking assumptions (A1) and (A2),
but replacing (A3) by a weaker version of the Pareto principle. Theorem 2 delivers SEU
representations for both the individuals and society, with a utilitarian ex post SWF, and
common beliefs about O (but not S). More comments follow the formal statement, re-
garding the status of the probabilities and the additive form of the representations. The
ensuing Corollary 2 shows the compromise of Theorem 2 to be optimal: adding any more
of the ex ante criterion yields an undesirable conclusion.
Theorem 2 Take the full set of assumptions for the ex post criterion in Proposition 2,
i.e., (B1), (B2) and (B3). Among the assumptions for the ex ante criterion in Proposition
1, take (A1) and (A2). Suppose also that the objective interim Pareto principle holds.
Then, there exist strictly positive probability vectors p ∈ ∆S and q ∈ ∆O, and for all
i ∈ I, there exist strictly positive probability vectors pi ∈ ∆S and continuous and increasing
utility functions ui on R, with the following properties. For all i ∈ I, the ex ante individual
preferences i have the SEU representation:
U i(X) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
pis qo u
i(xso), for all X ∈ RS×O, (7)
while the ex ante social preference  has the SEU representation:
Wxa(X) =
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
ps qoWxp(xso), for all X ∈ RI×S×O. (8)
8This troubling argument indirectly connects with worries that Savage (1972) once expressed concerning
“small worlds” and the problem they raise for his SEU theory.
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Furthermore, there is a vector of positive weights r = (ri)i∈I such that the ex post social
welfare function Wxp has the additive form
Wxp(x) :=
∑
i∈I
ri ui(xi), for all x ∈ RI . (9)
In these representations, the vectors p, q and r are unique, and the utility functions ui are
unique up to positive affine representations with a common multiplier.
These conclusions make two major additions to those of the base-line Proposition 2. First,
while that result said nothing of the decision theory satisfied by the individuals, they
now have SEU representations for their preferences i. By endowing the individuals with
identical probabilities on O and idiosyncratic probabilities on S, these representations
justify our objective/subjective interpretation of the two sources of uncertainty. Observe
that Theorem 1 and 2 involve different epistemic attitudes on the part of society. While it
previously did not form probabilistic beliefs on s, it now entertains such beliefs. A common
feature, however, society never regulates individual beliefs on the subjective source.
Second, all Pareto conditions that are being assumed are translated into weighted sums
of individual utilities. Indeed, the ex post social utility Wxp, which Proposition 2 did not
determine, turns out to be a weighted sum of ex post individual utilities. Note that this
function is state-independent, unlike the corresponding one in Theorem 1. Also, for each
given s, the objective interim social welfare function is a weighted sum of the individuals’
objective interim expected utilities:∑
o∈O
qoWxp(xo) =
∑
i∈I
ri
∑
o∈O
qo u
i(xso).
No such decomposition exists for either the subjective interim social welfare function∑
s∈S psWxp(xs) or the ex ante social utility Wxa, which reflects the absence of the sub-
jective interim and ex ante Pareto principles.9
At this juncture, we can finalize the comparison of our results with Harsanyi’s (1955).
In his von Neumann-Morgenstern framework, the conclusion that the ex post SWF is a
weighted sum of ex post individual utilities automatically follows from the earlier conclusion
that ex ante SWF is a weighted sum of ex ante individual utilities. By contrast, we
obtain the two weighted sum conclusions from different assumptions in separate results,
i.e., Theorem 1 for the ex ante conclusion, and the present Theorem 2 for the ex post one.
Lastly, we show that any further attempt at reconciling the two social welfare criteria
would precipitate the classic impossibility. Indeed, adding the ex ante Pareto principle
collapses the individual probabilities pis onto the social ones ps . We actually prove this in
slightly stronger form.
Corollary 2 Under the assumptions of Theorem 2, the following three conditions are
equivalent: (a) for all s ∈ S, %s satisfies the subjective interim Pareto principle; (b)
for all i ∈ I, pi = p; (c) the ex ante Pareto principle holds.
9By substituting (9) into (8), we can express Wxa as a weighted sum of u
i values. But since society
uses its own probability p, this expression is not a sum of the individual SEU representations from (7).
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The solution offered by Theorem 2 should be compared with that of Gilboa et al.
(2004) (hereafter GSS), which has recently attracted significant attention. In the same
Savage framework as Mongin (1995), GSS assume the ex post criterion in full and the ex
ante criterion in part. They limit the ex ante Pareto principle to comparisons of social
prospects which do not involve probabilistic disagreements between the individuals. From
this, they are able to conclude that (i) society’s ex post preference is represented by a
weighted sum of ex post individual utility functions, i.e., Harsanyi’s ex post conclusion,
and that (ii) society’s probability equals a weighted average of individual probabilities,
i.e., the linear pooling rule of the statistics and the management literature:
p =
∑
i∈I
aipi for some constants ai ≥ 0.
Importantly, their assumptions do not entail that (iii) society’s SEU representation can be
represented in terms of the individuals’ SEU representations, let alone by a weighted sum
of them, as in Harsanyi’s ex ante conclusion. Adding (iii) would simply reinstate one of
the impossibilies proved in Mongin (1995).
Despite the dissimilar frameworks, a comparison is possible between the GSS conclu-
sions and those of Theorem 2. We also derive (i), also refrain from deriving (iii), but most
importantly, do not derive (ii). Whether (ii) is desirable is a central concern of Section 6.
6 Spurious unanimity and complementary ignorance
Let us first consider the ex ante-oriented compromise embodied in Theorem 1. As it retains
the ex ante social welfare criterion in full, it is open to the objection of spurious unanimity
that is now often raised against this criterion, and more specifically, against the ex ante
Pareto principle. Mongin (1997) introduced this objection and coined the expression for it.
To make our argument self-contained, we briefly restate an example from his initial paper.
Imagine the members of society are spread out in two areas, an island and a mainland,
and the Government is concerned with the lack of communication between them. Thus, it
considers connecting one area to the other by a bridge, and being democratically inspired,
organizes a public hearing. At this stage, it is not clear whether the traffic flow will
mostly go from the island to the mainland, or in the other direction.10 As it happens,
the Islanders think that the former consequence is more probable than the latter, while
the Mainlanders have the opposite belief. It is also the case that the Islanders value
the former consequence more than the latter, while the Mainlanders have the opposite
ranking. For relevant probability and utility values fitting this situation, SEU and even
more general decision theories predict that both groups will express support for the project.
Thus, if the Government adheres to the ex ante Pareto principle, it will push it forward.
However, this would be a dubious decision to make. The two groups are unanimous in
preferring the bridge, but spuriously, since they are in fact twice opposed - i.e., in their
utility and probability comparisons – and their disagreements just offset in the SEU or
10We may assume that the bridge is financially feasible, whichever the main direction of the flow is.
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related calculation. Arguably, the Government should refrain from endorsing unanimous
preferences in those cases in which individuals so strongly differ from each other.
The bridge example takes the direction of the flow to be subjectively, not objectively
uncertain; in the present notation, this would be evaluated in terms of the pi, not the q.
Thus, the example is damaging for the solution proposed in Theorem 1, and even for any
solution that would just retain the subjective interim Pareto principle instead of the ex
ante Pareto principle. But this defect must be weighed against the advantage we stressed
earlier of endowing society with a state-dependent representation of its ex post preferences,
an advantage that the solution proposed in Theorem 2 does not enjoy.
Gilboa et al. (2004) have taken up the spurious unanimity objection, using the different
example of a duel. If two people agree to fight a duel, this is presumably because they have
both opposite beliefs (on who will win) and opposite preferences (on who should survive).
Applying the ex ante Pareto principle would make duels socially permissible, a seemingly
undesirable consequence. While the bridge example questions the optimality of procuring
a unanimously desired public good, this even simpler example questions the optimality of
legally endorsing mutually agreed individual transactions. The GSS theorem mentioned in
last section defines a compromise between the ex ante and ex post criteria that takes care
of the spurious unanimity objection. Let us now examine this theorem in more detail.
Formally, given a set of states Ω, GSS introduce the family F of all events on whose
probabilities all individuals agree, and they require society to respect only those unanimous
comparisons which take place between social prospects on Ω that are measurable with
respect to F . For instance, if a social prospect is constant on the cells of a partition,
and each cell receives the same probabilities from all individuals, then it satisfies the
measurability restriction. This restricted form of the ex ante Pareto principle makes the
bridge and duel examples inoperative, since it precludes probabilistic disagreement from
cancelling utility disagreement. Remarkably, no more than this condition is needed to
entail conclusions (i) and (ii) of last section when it is conjoined with the assumption that
the individuals satisfy Savage’s SEU postulates (which correspond to the decision-theoretic
part of the ex ante criterion) and the assumption that society also does (which corresponds
to the decision-theoretic part of the ex post criterion11).
However, as we now show, this elegant construction can go wrong if the individuals have
private information and revise their probabilities accordingly. Consider a society made out
of two individuals, Alice and Bob, a partitition of the set of states Ω into three events
E1, E2, E3, and two prospects, f and g, which we describe in terms of the utility values
that each of the three events brings to Alice and Bob. We assume that they share the same
utility function, and initially have the same probabilistic beliefs, as in the next table.
E1 E2 E3
Alice’s and Bob’s utilities for f 1 0 1
Alice’s and Bob’s utilities for g 0 1 0
Alice’s and Bob’s probabilities 0.49 0.02 0.49
11In the Savage framework, the remaining part of the ex post criterion, i.e., the ex post Pareto principle,
follows from either the ex ante principle or its GSS restricted form.
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Initially, Alice and Bob both assign a SEU of 0.98 to f and an SEU of 0.02 to g, so that
they both prefer f over g. Thus, GSS’s restricted ex ante Pareto principle says that society
should also prefer f over g.
To make the example more concrete, suppose a card has been drawn at random from
a well-shuﬄed deck containing only one Joker. Let E1 denote the event “Red Suit”(i.e.,
Hearts or Diamonds), E3 denote the event “Black Suit” (i.e., Clubs or Spades), and E2
denote the event “Joker”. Thus, f is a bet on “Suit Card”, whereas g is a bet on “Joker”.
Alice and Bob will equally split the winnings of either bet. Given the (unanimous) prob-
abilities and utility assignments in the table, both Alice and Bob prefer to bet on “Suit
Card” rather than “Joker”. Now, suppose Alice privately receives information that the
card is not from a black suit; i.e., she observes E1 ∪ E2. Meanwhile Bob privately learns
that the card is not from a red suit; i.e., he observes E2∪E3. Granting that Alice and Bob
do not communicate with each other, they will reach the following probabilities and SEU
values from Bayesian updating:
P (E1) P (E2) P (E3) SEU(f) SEU(g)
Alice 0.96 0.04 0 0.96 0.04
Bob 0 0.04 0.96 0.96 0.04
Let us construct the family F of events on the probabilities of which the Alice and Bob
agree. Both put P (E1 ∪ E3) = 0.96 and P (E2) = 0.04, so F = {∅, E1 ∪ E3, E2,S}.
The prospects f and g are constant on E1 ∪ E3 and constant on E2, hence measurable
with respect to F , so from GSS’s restricted ex ante Pareto principle, f should be socially
preferred to g. However, if Alice knows the card is not black, and Bob knows the card is
not red, then the card must be the Joker. But then, society should prefer g to f , contrary
to what GSS’s restricted ex ante Pareto principle says. If Alice and Bob unanimously
prefer f over g, this is only because each one has information the other one lacks; let us
say they are in a state of complementary ignorance.
This counterexample also hits the linear pooling rule, which is not surprising since GSS
recover it as a consequence of their restricted ex ante Pareto principle. If the social observer
averages Alice and Bob’s posterior probabilities, an incorrect value P (E2) = 0.04 follows.
One may object that this is not the proper interpretation of the linear pooling rule in a
context where individuals have private information. Rather, the social observer should first
average Alice and Bob’s prior probabilities, and then update this average after deducing
from their posteriors that E2 occurred; this would deliver the correct value P (E2) = 1. But
this conclusion could be reached by simply observing the posteriors, without any averaging.
So this argument does not save the linear pooling rule.12
At this point, another objection will perhaps surface: neither the linear pooling rule nor
the GSS restriction of the ex ante Pareto principle are intended to cover the case of private
information. In other words, both are stated under the implicit proviso that the individuals’
probabilities are priors, unlike the posteriors of the last table. However, the distinction
12We may also note that this two-step process of revising and averaging does not give the same result as
the direct averaging of posteriors. In technical jargon, the linear pooling rule is not “externally Bayesian”,
an old observation of the literature (see, e.g., Genest and Zidek (1986) and Clemen and Winkler (2007)).
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between these two cases is partly a matter of convention. Depending on what one considers
to be the underlying knowledge and what one considers to be information, a prior in one
context becomes a posterior in another, and vice versa. Leaving aside the hypothetical
constructs of the “original position” or the “veil of ignorance”, which are usually understood
in terms of pure priors, the individual probabilities relevant to normative economics are
typically posteriors. Instead of the prior versus posterior distinction, we would privilege
that between those posteriors which can be analyzed so as to reveal information to the
social observer, as in the Alice and Bob example, and those which cannot.
All this is to say that to derive the linear pooling rule, as GSS do, is a mixed blessing.
In the end, one might view as a advantage that Theorem 2 involves no connection between
the social probability and the individual ones. This does not give a full solution to the
complementary ignorance problem, but at least it does not give an incorrect answer.13
7 Comparisons with the literature
The conflict between the ex ante and ex post social welfare criteria has attracted much
attention recently. The common strategies are to weaken either the ex ante Pareto principle
or the SEU assumptions, whether on society or the individuals, while preserving the ex
post Pareto principle. Gilboa et al. (2004) (GSS) epitomize the first strategy. An original
variant can be found in Nehring (2004) and Chambers and Hayashi (2014), who assume
that agents have private information and restrict the ex ante Pareto principle to situations
where it is common knowledge that one prospect ex ante Pareto-dominates another. If
society satisfies statewise dominance, even this weak assumption delivers the undesirably
strong conclusion that the agents share the same prior on the common knowledge events.
This impossibility theorem refines the classic one.14
Gilboa et al. (2014) also explore the first strategy. Working with utility representations
rather than axiomatically, they define a new form of Paretian comparison by saying that
prospect f No-Betting Pareto (NBP) dominates prospect g if there exists some probability
measure p such that f yields at least as high a p-expected utility as g for every individual.
They show that NBP-dominance holds if and only if, for any weighted sum of ex post
utilities, g does not statewise dominate f . They explore the consequences for financial
markets of restricting the ex ante Pareto principle to NBP-dominance comparisons, an
analysis continued by Gayer et al. (2014).
Other writers use the second strategy, possibly in conjunction with the first. Three
analyses in this category lead to related conclusions despite having been developed inde-
pendently. Thus, Qu (2017) assumes that both society and the individuals conform to
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)’s maximin expected utility (MEU) theory, a by now classic
generalization of Anscombe and Aumann’s SEU theory that endows decision makers with
sets of probabilistic beliefs rather than single probabilistic beliefs. Qu also constructs a
13To check formally that there is no connection, suppose that, for any choice of ui, the pi are the same
and differ from p. The assumptions of the theorem can be satisfied under this supposition.
14Chambers and Hayashi further show that the ex ante social welfare function is a weighted sum of
individual expected utilities, whereas Nehring assumes this.
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variant of the ex ante Pareto principle (RCEPO) that extends it in one direction and re-
stricts it in another. Given his decision-theoretic assumptions, the conjunction of the ex
post Pareto principle and this ex ante variant holds if and only if the ex post social welfare
function is a weighted sum of individual utilities and the social set of probabilities P is a
convex combination of the individuals’ sets Pi. In terms of GSS’s two conclusions described
in Section 5, Qu recovers (i) and generalizes (ii) in accordance with MEU decision theory.
Alon and Gayer (2014) assume Savage’s SEU theory for the individuals, and put axioms
on society that endow it with a MEU representation, thus with a probability set P . They
strengthen GSS’s restricted ex ante Pareto principle to a Consensus Pareto version, which
says that if all individuals (according to their own probabilistic beliefs) deem that prospect
f yields a higher SEU than prospect g for every individual, then society should prefer f
over g. This excludes the spurious unanimity implication of the ex ante Pareto principle,
while accommodating some situations where individuals have different probabilistic beliefs.
Given the decision-theoretic assumptions, society satisfies Consensus Pareto if and only if
the ex post SWF is a weighted sum of individual utilities and the social probability set
P is included in the convex hull of the individual probability measures. Then, Alon and
Gayer recover (i) and generalize (ii), although this generalization differs from Qu’s.15
In an Anscombe-Aumann framework, Danan et al. (2016) assume that society and the
individuals have partial orders  and i that admit representations in the sense of Bewley
(2002), i.e., there are sets P and Pi of probability distributions such that f  g (resp.
f i g) if and only if f yields at least as high an expected utility as g according to all
elements in P (resp. in Pi). Given these decision-theoretic assumptions and the further
condition that individual utility functions are affinely independent, society satisfies an ex
ante Pareto principle if and only if the ex post social welfare function is a weighted sum
of individual utilities and P is included in the intersection of the Pi. This amounts to a
conjunction of (i) and a substitute for - not a generalization of - (ii). In the particular
case of SEU theory, the individuals’ unique probability measure must be the same for all
individuals and society, which recovers the classic impossibility. The authors also consider a
Common Taste Pareto version of the ex ante Pareto principle; this amounts to restricting
the principle to pairs of prospects such that all individuals agree on the ranking of the
consequences obtained from these prospects (and convex combinations thereof). Given
the decision-theoretic assumptions, Common Taste Pareto holds if and only if and P is
included in the convex hull of the union of the Pi. This is again (i) conjoined with a
generalization of (ii), which is specific to the paper.
The positive results in the three aforementioned papers have attractive features, but
they are still vulnerable to the “complementary ignorance” example from Section 6, because
SEU is a special case of both the MEU and Bewley theories. In that example, Alice and
Bob have the same utility function, so Alon and Gayer’s (2014) Consensus Pareto and
Danan et al.’s (2016) Common Taste Pareto both reduce to ex ante Pareto, which as we
have seen, forces the social preferences to wrongly ignore private information. Likewise,
15Here we focus on Alon and Gayer’s (2014) preprint rather than their final (2016) version because it
better connects with the other work reviewed here. See Billot and Qu (2017) for more on the same line.
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for SEU preferences, Qu’s (2017) RCEPO axiom reduces to ex ante Pareto.16
For the sake of completeness, we briefly mention other investigations of the ex ante
and ex post social welfare criteria that do not fit in the previous discussion. Thus, Bil-
lot and Vergopoulos (2016) endow each individual with a personalized state space and a
personalized consequence set, and society with a state space and a consequence set that
are Cartesian products of these spaces. Assuming SEU theory for individuals and society,
Billot and Vergopoulos show that the latter satisfies a set of Pareto conditions if and only
if the usual conclusion (i) holds, and the social probability measure is the product of the
individual ones, an interesting alternative to (ii). However, their framework presupposes
that individuals face independent risks, as in standard insurance markets. This severely
constrains its applications to economic policy.17
In a framework with a finite state space and given ex post individual utilities, Hayashi
and Lombardi (2018) further explore the consequences of assuming MEU theory for either
the individuals or society. Unlike the earlier writers, they do not attempt to reconcile the ex
ante and ex post criteria, but rather to compare their normative consequences, focusing on
maximin “egalitarianism” rather than weighted sum “utilitarianism”. This paper mostly
belongs to the separate and growing literature on egalitarianism under uncertainty; see the
surveys by Mongin and Pivato (2016) and Fleurbaey (2018).
Some other papers have explored the problems the ex ante criterion in relation to finan-
cial markets. Standard economic theory generally endorses transactions on these markets,
thus implicitly assuming the ex ante Pareto principle, but uncertainty raises spurious una-
nimity objections here as it does elsewhere. Thus, Posner and Weyl (2013), Blume et al.
(2015) and others identify purely speculative transactions with those driven by different
beliefs, and argue for public regulation in this case. Instead of Pareto dominance, Brunner-
meier et al. (2014) strengthen the concept of Pareto inefficiency, by defining a prospect f to
be belief-neutral inefficient if, for every probability measure p arising from a convex combi-
nation of the individual ones, there is some prospect yielding a higher p-expected utility for
every agent than f . By this criterion, they identify speculative transactions for which they
recommend regulatory scrutiny. Going against the tide, Cre`s and Tvede (2018) construct
a paradox of regulation, to the effect that if it applies to multiple related non-speculative
transactions, it must consistently authorize all transactions, including speculative ones.
8 Conclusion
By complexifying the underlying model of uncertainty, we have identified intermediate
positions between the classical ex ante and ex post social welfare criteria. Whereas some
of the recent literature has departed from SEU theory, we have instead chosen to enrich
this theory with a distinction it does not normally explore: that between two sources of
16Indeed, applying the results of Qu or Danan et al. to this example yields SEU social preferences with
social beliefs satisfying (ii). Applying Alon and Gayer’s result yields MEU social preferences in which all
priors agree that P (E1 ∪ E3) = 0.96 and P (E2) = 0.04, so the social ranking of f and g is still incorrect.
17 In the bridge example, the risk faced by the Islanders is not independent of the risk faced by the
Mainlanders, and in the duel example, the risks faced by the duellists are not independent either.
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uncertainty, here interpreted as being objective and subjective respectively. This semantic
distinction emerges in the representation theorems through the difference between multiple
probability assessments for one source and a single probability assessment for the other.
The intermediate positions we have uncovered do not fully resolve the underlying trade-
off: one must still choose between a primarily ex ante and a primarily ex post solution.
But, as we have shown, the former can reap the benefits of an ex post state-dependent
social welfare function without depriving society of all probabilistic beliefs, and the latter
can extend some way in the direction of ex ante Paretianism, while avoiding both the clas-
sic spurious unanimity objection and the novel complementary ignorance objection. To
introduce the latter was another contribution of this paper.
We feel that the theoretical potential of the twofold uncertainty framework is not ex-
hausted. Elsewhere, it has served to introduce a preference axiomatization, in a Bayesian
theorist’s style, of the property of stochastic independence (see Mongin, 2017). It may
guide other foundational explorations in probability theory, in particular a more thorough
discussion of objective probability than that provided here. We also feel that the comple-
mentary ignorance objection calls for more attention, as it suggests that collective beliefs
should take into account not merely individual beliefs, but also their origin and justifica-
tion, and this opens new avenues for the theory of social preference under uncertainty.
Appendices
A Technical background
We begin by restating the definition of a conditional relation in terms of its source relation,
and the separability property that turns a conditional relation into an ordering.
Suppose that a weak preference ordering R is defined on a product set X =∏`∈LX`,
where L is a finite set of indexes. Take a subset of indexes J ⊆ L and its complement
K := L\J . Denote the subproduct sets∏`∈J X` and∏`∈KX` by XJ and XK, respectively.
By definition, the conditional induced by R on J is the relation RJ on XJ thus defined:
for all ξJ , ξ
′
J ∈ XJ ,
ξJ RJ ξ
′
J if and only if for some ξK ∈ XK, (ξJ , ξK) R (ξ′J , ξK).
By a well-known fact, the conditional RJ is an ordering if and only if R is separable in J ,
that is: for all ξJ , ξ
′
J ∈ XJ and ξK, ξ′K ∈ XK,
(ξJ , ξK) R (ξ
′
J , ξK) if and only if (ξJ , ξ
′
K) R (ξ
′
J , ξ
′
K).
In this case, we may also say that J is a R-separable. Clearly, separability in J entails
that R is increasing with RJ , i.e., that for all ξJ , ξ
′
J ∈ XJ and ξK ∈ XK,
if ξJ RJ ξ
′
J , then (ξJ , ξK) R (ξ
′
J , ξK),
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and if the RJ -comparison is in fact strict, so is the resulting R-comparison. Conversely, if
RJ is some ordering on XJ , the property that R on X is increasing with RJ entails that R
is weakly separable in J .18
Section 2 considers several cases of this construction; in each of them, X` = R for all
` ∈ L. If L = I×S×O and R is the social preference , then we can let J = I×{s}×O to
obtain s-conditional social preference relations, let J = I×S×{o} to obtain o-conditional
social preference relations, and let J = {i} × S × O for the ex ante Pareto principle. If
L = S × O and R is an individual preference i, then we let J = {s} × O to obtain
s-conditional individual preference relations, and let J = S × {o} to obtain o-conditional
individual preference relations. If L = I × O and R is the s-conditional social preference
s, then we let J = {i}×O to obtain the subjective interim Pareto principle. Other cases
are similar.19 These relations may or may not be orderings, i.e., from the first equivalence
stated above, their source relation may or may be separable in the associated index set.
As we assume that conditional preference orderings exist across the uncertainty type or
not at all, it follows from the second equivalence that the ordering assumptions could be
restated in terms of dominance.20
Let us now take X to be an open box in RL, i.e., X = ∏`∈LX`, where the X` are
open intervals. An ordering  on X has an additive representation if it is represented by
a function U : X−→R of the form
U(x) :=
∑
`∈L
u`(x`), (A1)
where u` : X `−→R, ` ∈ L. We now state a proposition that will be useful later. A proof
can be devised from the formal arguments in Mongin and Pivato (2015).
Proposition A1 Take L = I × S ×O, with |I| , |S| , |O| ≥ 2, and view elements X ∈ RL
as arrays [xiso]
i∈I
s∈S,o∈O. If a continuous order  on RL is increasing in every coordinate,
and is separable in each i ∈ I, each s ∈ S, and each o ∈ O, then it has an additive
utility representation U : X−→R of the form U(x) :=
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
uiso(x
i
so), where each
uiso : R −→ R is a continuous, increasing function. Furthermore, the functions {uiso}i∈Is∈S,o∈O
are unique up to positive affine transformation (PAT) with a common multiplier.
We now specialize the basic sets still differently. Take L = J ×K with |J |, |K| ≥ 2, and
X = RL, viewing elements X ∈ X as matrices [xjk]j∈Jk∈K, with j ∈ J indexing the rows and
k ∈ K indexing the columns. Alternatively, think of X as a J -indexed array of row vectors
xj := [xjk]k∈ K ∈ RK, or as a K-indexed array of columns vectors xk := [xjk]j∈J ∈ RJ . Now
consider a continuous ordering  on X . Here are three axioms that  might satisfy.
18For these definitions and basic facts, see Fishburn (1970), Keeney and Raiffa (1976), and Wakker
(1989). What is called separable here is sometimes called weakly separable elsewhere.
19Here we make the obvious identifications of {s} × O with O, S × {o} with S, etc. Similar routine
identifications will occur below without being mentioned.
20Thus, our statement “%i induces conditional preferences %is”, which definitionally says that the %is
are orderings, equivalently says that %i satisfies dominance with respect to the %is.
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Coordinate Monotonicity: For all X,Y ∈ X , if xjk ≥ yjk for all (j, k) ∈ J × K, then
X  Y. If, in addition, xjk > yjk for some (j, k) ∈ J ×K, then X  Y.
Row Preferences: For each column j ∈ J ,  is separable in {j} × K.
Column Preferences: For all rows k ∈ K,  is separable in J × {k}.
Define j and k to be the conditional relations of  on j and k, respectively. It follows
from Row Preferences that the j are orderings on RK, and from Column Preferences that
the k are orderings on RJ . Moreover,  is increasing with respect to each of these
conditional relations. The next two axioms force the conditional orders to be invariant.
Invariant Row Preferences: Row Preferences holds, and there is an ordering J on YK
such that j=J for all j ∈ J .
Invariant Column Preferences: Column Preferences holds, and there is an ordering K on
YJ such that k= K for all k ∈ K.
These five axioms draw their use from the following proposition, which the proofs in
Appendix B will repeatedly use. (Each of these proofs will involve two of the sets I, S, O
taking the place of the abstract indexing sets J and K.)
Proposition A2 (a) Suppose a continuous preference order  on X = RL satisfies
Coordinate Monotonicity, Row Preferences and Column Preferences. Then for all j ∈ J
and k ∈ K, there is an increasing, continuous function vjk : R −→R, such that  is
represented by the function W : X −→R defined by: W (X) :=
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈J
vjk(x
j
k). In this
representation, the functions vjk are unique up to PAT with a common multiplier.
(b) Assume Invariant Column Preferences instead of Column Preferences, holding the other
conditions the same as in part (a). Then there is a strictly positive probability
vector p ∈ ∆K, and for all j ∈ J , there is an increasing, continuous function
uj : R −→R, such that  is represented by the function W : X −→R defined by:
W (X) :=
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈J
pk u
j(xjk). In this representation, the probability vector p is unique,
and the functions uj are unique up to PAT with a common multiplier.
(c) Assume Invariant Row Preferences instead of Row Preferences, holding the other con-
ditions the same as in part (b). Then there is an increasing, continuous function
u : R −→ R and strictly positive probability vectors q ∈ ∆J and p ∈ ∆K such that 
is represented by the function W : X −→ R defined by W (X) :=
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈J
qj pk u(x
j
k).
In this representation, q and p are unique, and u is unique up to a PAT.
Proof. See Mongin and Pivato (2015). Part (a) follows from Proposition 1(b). Part (b)
follows from Theorem 1(c,d), and part (c) from Corollary 1(c,d). The axioms of that paper
are stated differently, because the domains considered there are not necessarily Cartesian
products. 
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B Proofs of the results of the paper
Our framework may seem to raise the possibility that conditional orderings depend on how
they are induced; e.g., that %so, as directly induced by %, differs from %so, as induced by
the ordering %s induced by %, or from %so, as induced by the ordering %o. But such a
discrepancy cannot occur, as the different forms of conditionalization commute with one
another (we skip the proof). In what follows, we use this property without saying.
Lemma B1 Let  be a continuous order on RI×S×O.
(a) If  induces interim preferences s and o, then it induces ex post preferences so.
(b) If, moreover, the interim preferences o are invariant, then for any given s, s induces
invariant ex post preferences so.
(c) If, moreover, the interim preferences o and s are both invariant, then the ex post
preferences so are invariant.
Proof. Let (s, o) ∈ S ×O. For all o ∈ O, let Jo := {(i′, s′, o); i′ ∈ I and s′ ∈ S}. Then Jo
is a -separable subset of I×S×O, because, by hypothesis,  induces interim preferences
o. Similarly, for all s ∈ S, let Ks := {(i′, s, o′); i′ ∈ I and o′ ∈ O}; this is a -separable
subset of I×S×O, because  induces interim preferences s. The nonempty intersection
Iso := Jo ∩ Ks is -separable by a classic result of Gorman (1968). Thus,  induces ex
post preferences so.
Adding the assumption that the interim preferences o induced by  are invariant, we
fix s and consider any pair o 6= o′. By commutativity of conditonalization , we can regard
the ex post preferences so and so′ as being induced by o and o′ , respectively. But
o=o′ , so that so=so′ , and now regarding these ex post preferences as being induced
by s , we conclude that this ordering induces invariant ex post preferences.
Now we add the assumption that the interim preferences s induced by  are invariant,
fix o and consider any pair s 6= s′. By symmetric reasoning, we conclude that so=s′o.
The two paragraphs together prove that, for all o, o′ ∈ O and s, s′ ∈ S, so=s′o′ , meaning
that  induces invariant ex post preferences. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Let J := S and K := O. We will check which of the axioms
of Appendix A apply to the ordering i, for any i ∈ I . Coordinate Monotonicity holds
because i induces preference orderings iso that coincide with the natural ordering of
real numbers, by statement (1). As the is (resp. the io) are invariant, Invariant Row
Preferences (resp. Invariant Column Preferences) holds. Thus, Proposition A2(c) yields the
expected utility representation (2) for i. Since  has a numerical representation that
is increasing with the i by the ex ante Pareto principle, the social representation (3)
follows. The uniqueness condition for F is obvious, and the other uniqueness statements
follow from Proposition A2(c). 
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Proof of Proposition 2. By Lemma B1(c), the assumption that  induces invariant interim
preferences of both kinds guarantees that  also induces invariant ex post preferences xp
on RI . These preferences inherit the continuity of  and the ex post Pareto principle makes
them increasing in every coordinate. Thus, each of them is represented by a continuous
and increasing function v : RI −→ R.
To any X ∈ RI×S×O, we associate the element X˜ ∈ RS×O whose (s, o) component is
x˜so := v(xso). The function V : RI×S×O → RS×O defined by V (X) := X˜ is continuous and
increasing in each component. By these two properties, the image set X˜ := V (RI×S×O) is
a set of the form YS×O, where Y := v(RI) is an open interval.
Define an ordering ˜ on X˜ by the condition that for all X˜, Y˜ ∈ X˜ , if X˜ = V (X) and
Y˜ = V (Y), then
X˜ ˜ Y˜ if and only if X  Y. (B1)
(To see that ˜ is mathematically well-defined by (B1), suppose V (X) = X˜ = V (X′) for
some X,X′ ∈ X . Then for all (s, o) ∈ S × O, we have v(xso) = v(x′so), and hence xso ≈xp
x′so. Thus X ≈ X′, because  is increasing relative to xp.) In terms of the Appendix
A, putting J := S and K := O, we conclude that ˜ is continuous and satisfies Invariant
Row Preferences and Invariant Column Preferences, and Coordinate Monotonicity, by using
the respective properties that  is continuous, induces invariant interim orderings s, and
induces invariant interim orderings o, and induces invariant ex post orderings xp . Thus,
Proposition A2(c) yields strictly positive probability vectors p ∈ ∆S and q ∈ ∆O, and a
continuous increasing function u : R −→ R, such that ˜ is represented by the function
W˜ : X˜ −→ R defined by W˜ (X˜) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
qo ps u(x˜so). Now set Wxa(X) := W˜ ◦ V (X) for
all X ∈ RI×S×O, and W xp(x) := u ◦ v(x) for all x ∈ RI to get the desired representations.
The uniqueness properties are those of Proposition A2(c).21 
Proof of Proposition 3. First we show that  is increasing in every coordinate. Let
(i, s, o) ∈ I × S × O. Statement (1) implies that i is increasing with respect to the
coordinate xis,o. By the ex ante Pareto principle,  is also increasing with respect to xis,o.
The result now follows from Theorem A2(b), by setting J := I andK := S×O. Ex ante
Pareto then becomes Row Preferences, while the existence of invariant ex post preferences
yields Invariant Column Preferences. Meanwhile,  satisfies Coordinate Monotonicity by the
previous paragraph. 
Proof of Theorem 1. First note that  is increasing in every coordinate, by exactly the
same argument as the first paragraph in the proof of Proposition 3. Next, since the i
relations are orderings and the ex ante Pareto principle makes  increasing with them,
 is separable in each i ∈ I. As  induces interim preferences of both types,  is also
separable in each s ∈ S and o ∈ O. It then follows from Proposition A1 that, for all
(i, s, o) ∈ I × S × O, there exist continuous and increasing functions uiso : R −→ R such
21Proposition A2(c) is stated for RJ×K , but it carries through to subsets Y J×K ⊆ RJ×K, when these
are open and take the form of a product of intervals.
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that  is represented by the function Wxa : RI×S×O −→ R defined by
Wxa (X) :=
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
uiso(x
i
so). (B2)
Furthermore, the uiso are unique up to positive affine transformations (PAT) with a common
multiplier. We can fix any Y ∈ RI×S×O and add constants to these functions so as to ensure
that uiso(y
i
so) = 0 for all (i, s, o) ∈ I × S × O.22 For convenience, fix some y ∈ R, and
suppose that yiso = y for all (i, s, o) ∈ I × S ×O.
For all i ∈ I, equation (B2) implies that the preference ordering i can be represented
by the function U i : RS×O −→ R defined by
U i(X) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
uiso(xso). (B3)
From Proposition 1 , there are continuous increasing utility functions u˜i : R −→ R, and
two strictly positive probability vectors pi ∈ ∆S and qi ∈ ∆O, such that i is represented
by the function U i : RS×O −→ R defined by
U i(X) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
qio p
i
s u˜
i(xso). (B4)
Furthermore, in this representation, pi and qi are unique, and u˜i is unique up to PAT. By
adding a constant, we ensure that u˜i(y) = 0.
From the uniqueness property applied to (B3) and (B4), there exist constants αi > 0
and βi ∈ R such that :
uiso(x) = α
i qio p
i
s u˜
i(x) + βi, for all (s, o) ∈ S ×O. (B5)
Substituting x = y into (B5) leads to βi = 0. Then substituting (B5) (for all i ∈ I) into
the representation (B2) yields:
Wxa (X) =
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
αi qio p
i
s u˜
i(xiso). (B6)
For given s ∈ S in this representation, we obtain a representation Vs : RI×O −→ R of the
interim preference s on RI×O :
Vs(X) :=
∑
i∈I
∑
o∈O
αi qio p
i
s u˜
i(xio). (B7)
Let Ys := (y, . . . , y) ∈ RI×O; then Vs(Ys) = 0.
Let us now put J := I and K := O, and check which axioms in Appendix A the
interim preference s satisfies. This is a continuous ordering by the continuity of . By
22To avoid burdening notation, we refer to the original and translated functions by the same symbol.
This convention is applied throughout the proofs.
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the representation (B7), s is separable in each {i}×O and each I×{o}, and increasing in
every coordinate , and thus satisfies Row Preferences, Column Preferences, and Coordinate
Monotonicity. As induces invarianto, Lemma B1(b) entails that the induced preferences
so are invariant, meaning that the stronger axiom of Invariant Column Preferences holds.
Hence, Proposition A2(b) yields a strictly positive probability vector rs ∈ ∆O, and for all
i ∈ I, continuous, increasing utility functions ûis : R −→ R such that s is represented by
the function V̂s : RI×O −→ R defined by
V̂s(X) :=
∑
i∈I
∑
o∈O
rso û
i
s(x
i
o). (B8)
In this representation, rs is unique and {ûis}i∈I are unique up to PAT with a common
multiplier. Add constants to ensure that ûis(y) = 0 for all i ∈ I. It follows that V̂s(Ys) = 0.
From the uniqueness property applied to (B7) and (B8), there exist γs > 0 and δs ∈ R
such that V̂s = γs Vs + δs. Substituting Ys leads to δs = 0. Since this holds for all s ∈ S,
we can conclude that
γs rso û
i
s = α
i qio p
i
s u˜
i, for all (i, s, o) ∈ I × S ×O (B9)
Let us now fix i and s in these equations. All the coefficients are positive and the increasing
functions ûis and u˜
i are nonzero for some y∗ ∈ R. Thus we can derive the relations:
rso
qio
=
αi pis u˜
i(y∗)
γs û
i
s(y
∗)
, for all o ∈ O. (B10)
The right-hand side of (B10) does not depend on o. Thus, the left-hand side must also
be independent of o, which means that the vectors qi and rs are scalar multiples of one
another. Thus, since they are probability vectors, we have qi = rs. Since this holds for all i
and s, we can drop the indexes. Denote the common probability vector by q. Substituting
q into (B6) and defining ui := αi u˜i, we get the formula (5) of the theorem. The other
parts readily follow. 
Proof of Theorem 2. For each i ∈ I, i satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 1. Thus,
by the argument used to prove this proposition, we conclude that there exist a continuous
increasing utility function ui : R −→ R, and strictly positive probability vectors pi ∈ ∆S
and qi ∈ ∆O, such that i is represented by the function U i : RS×O −→ R defined by
U i(X) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
qio p
i
s u
i(xso), and the u
i are unique up to PAT. This establishes the SEU
representation (7). Fix x ∈ R. By adding constants, we ensure that ui(x) = 0 for all i ∈ I.
Meanwhile, Proposition 2 yields strictly positive probability vectors p ∈ ∆S and q ∈
∆O, and a continuous increasing function Wxp : RI −→ R, such that  is represented by
the function Wxa : X −→ R defined by Wxa(X) :=
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
ps qoWxp(xso), where p and q
are unique, and Wxp is unique up to PAT. This establishes the SEU representation (8).
Let x := (x, . . . , x). By adding a constant, we ensure that Wxp(x) = 0.
27
Now let J = I and K = O and consider how the axioms of Appendix A apply to
s for any given s ∈ S, recalling that these interim social preferences are well-defined
and invariant (i.e. independent of s) . The objective interim Pareto principle makes s
separable in each i ∈ I, so that Row Preferences holds. By Proposition 2, the ex post
social preferences so are well-defined and invariant, so that Invariant Column Preferences
holds. Then, by Proposition A2(b), there exist a probability vector q˜ ∈ ∆O, and for all
i ∈ I, continuous increasing functions vi such that s is represented by the function
W : RI×O −→ R defined by W (X) :=
∑
i∈I
∑
o∈O
q˜o v
i(xiso), where q˜ is unique and the v
i are
unique up to PAT with a common multiplier. The same representation holds for all s ∈ S.
Adding a constant, we ensure that vi(x) = 0 for all i ∈ I.
We now show that q = q˜. By fixing s ∈ S and applying the representation Wxa
to elements X whose components for s′ 6= s are fixed at some values, we obtain a new
representation for s and reduce it to the representation just obtained in terms of W by
the standard uniqueness property. That is, there exist constants α > 0 and β such that∑
o∈O
qoWxp(xo) = α
∑
i∈I
∑
o∈O
q˜o v
i(xio) + β, for all X ∈ RI×O. Substituting xio = x for all
i ∈ I and o ∈ O leads to β = 0. Now fixing o and putting xio′ = x for all o′ 6= o leads to
the equation: Wxp(xo) =
q˜o
qo
∑
i∈I
α vi(xiso), for all xo ∈ RI . Since this holds for all o ∈ O,
the two probability vectors q and q˜ are proportional, hence equal. Hence
Wxp(xo) =
∑
i∈I
α vi(xiso), for all xo ∈ RI . (B11)
and the invariant conditional preference s is represented by the function W˜ : RI×O −→ R
defined by W˜ (X) :=
∑
i∈I
∑
o∈O
qo α v
i(xiso). We now use a similar argument to show that
q = qi for all i ∈ I. Fixing i ∈ I and s ∈ S, we can obtain a representation for the
invariant interim preferences is in two ways: first, from W˜ by applying this representation
to elements of RI×O whose components for i′ 6= i are fixed at some values (because s
satisfies the objective interim Pareto principle), and second, from U i by applying this
representation to elements of RS×O whose components for s′ 6= s are fixed at some values.
By the standard uniqueness property, there exist γis > 0 and δ
i
s such that∑
o∈O
qoαv
i(xo) = γ
i
s
∑
o∈O
qio p
i
s u
i(xo) + δ
i
s, for all x ∈ RO. (B12)
Substituting xo = x into (B12) leads to δ
i
s = 0. Fix o ∈ O. Put xo′ = x for all o′ 6= o
yields:
qo
qio
αvi(x) = γis p
i
s u
i(x) for all x ∈ R. (B13)
The right-hand side of (B13) is independent of o. Thus, the probability vectors q and qi
are proportional, hence equal, and thus
αvi(x) = γis p
i
s u
i(x) for all x ∈ R. (B14)
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Equation (B14) holds for all s ∈ S. Hence, for all i ∈ I, the product ri := γis pis is
independent of s; note that ri > 0. Equation (B14) now says αvi = ri ui. Substituting this
into the representation (B11) yields the representation (9) for xp. 
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